It is a great privilege to deliver the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture. As you all just heard, he had a well-deserved reputation for saying what needed to be said. It is in that spirit that I address you all today.
Albert Einstein is best known for his theory of relativity. Had he opted for a career in political science, he could have actually easily been famous for a theory of insanity. His definition of that state of mind was doing the same thing over and over again - and expecting different results. A corollary of that is to do the same thing in different situations - and then expect the same results. This is important to recognize at a moment in world politics when many of our long-held assumptions no longer hold true. If the world is different, we need to think, talk and engage accordingly. Falling back on the past is unlikely to help with the future.
The world is not just different; the very structure of the international order is undergoing a profound transformation. American nationalism, the rise of China, the saga of Brexit and the rebalancing of the global economy are often cited as the more dramatic examples of change. In fact, the phenomenon is far more pervasive than just these illustrations. We have seen the return of old empires like Russia, Iran or Turkey. The Middle East is in ferment, even by its exceptionally volatile standards. The centrality of ASEAN to Asia is not what it is used to be. Demographic and economic trends in Africa are giving that continent a greater salience. South America is again a battleground for ideas. But we are also talking beyond geographies and orthodox politics. What defines power and determines national standing is also no longer the same. Technology, connectivity and trade are at the heart of new contestations. In a more constrained and interdependent world, competition has to be pursued perforce more intelligently. The global commons is also more in disputation as multilateralism weakens. Even climate change is a factor, contributing to geopolitics amongst others by the opening of an Arctic passage. In short, change is upon us as never before.
COMMENTS - It is with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as the world and the international order began witnessing a fundamental change. The economy of China grew by leaps and bounds. Whereas it was poorer than India in the 1970s, its economy is over five times that of India’s, and it is also a major manufacturing hub today. Consequently, its economic interests have started to grow, which have directly reflected in its geopolitical interests and thereby the fundamentals of its foreign policy. It has emerged a heavyweight in Asian geopolitics as it has increased investments and has undertaken infrastructure projects in various countries. Through its One Belt One Road initiative, it aims to establish itself firmly as an undisputed leader in Asia. It has grown into a power influential enough to profoundly affect the geopolitical interests of the United States.
This brings us to the state of affairs of the nation that eventually emerged victorious in the Cold War: The United States of America. Whereas it had a clear global leadership vision in light of its unquestionably powerful and influential position following the Second World War as evidenced by initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, a position that continued through the testing times of the Cold War, the America of today seeks to break away from its globalist image, as nationalist voices have begun gaining momentum in the country. The United States seeks to withdraw itself from the role of “world police” as recurrently asserted by then candidate and now president, Donald John Trump. It has increasingly begun relying on regional powers like India to shape the geopolitical realities in Asia, so much so that it has officially begun terming the Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific region.
Within the region and in its vicinity lie powers, such as Iran, which, for instance, possesses power enough to blockade the Hormuz Strait through which much of the world oil transport occurs, and Turkey, which is a major player in the Middle East. Notwithstanding its economic condition, the influence that Russia wields over the geopolitics of Asia and Europe is, in no way, to be misconstrued.
The rise of regional powers like India and China has taken their geopolitical interests across continents, and both seek to establish significant influence in the continent of Africa as both have extended economic aid to various African nations. Countries like Brazil have begun growing in importance as they contribute significantly in forums such as BRICS, and Venezuela is of immense economic interest to the world, and Venezuela is watched with keen interest for its economic conditions and the way it may affect the global economy at large.
Nevertheless, the geopolitics of today has transcended mere geographical and territorial ambitions or disputes. Much of the activity in the international order is driven by trade, connectivity and technology, the fruits largely of the capitalist world. The world is no longer bipolar, revolving around two centers of power. It is much more interdependent and interconnected. The efforts taken by major countries in the sphere of climate change also shape the international order today, as evidenced by the politics that arises out of agreements on the Paris Accord.
If the landscape looks very different today, so do India’s partners. The relevance of the US or China is far more than anytime earlier. The Russian relationship has defied odds by remaining incredibly steady. Japan has become an important factor in our calculations. The rediscovery of Europe is again underway, with France now a critical strategic partner. The Gulf has been bridged in an extraordinarily effective manner. ASEAN has grown closer, and Australia’s relevance is more apparent. Africa is the focus of development assistance and opening of new Embassies. And as you would have noted from the recent UN General Assembly, our outreach extends from South America and the Caribbean to the South Pacific and Baltics. Closer home, there is an unprecedented investment in the neighborhood whose consequences are becoming apparent. Put together, the scale and intensity of our global engagement would be difficult to recognize for someone dealing with it even a few years ago.
COMMENTS – It is, therefore, without doubt that the global situation is radically different when compared with what was observed even two decades ago, let alone the Cold War era. It is prudent to observe India’s position in the global state of affairs. Once hostile to India, the United States is today a vital partner in terms of defence and non-defence economics. Following the 1991 Indian Economic Reforms, the U.S. found in India, a significant market for its businesses, which started shaping the relations between both the countries. India’s stellar record of maturity in handling its newfound status as a nuclear power gave rise to confidence in both the nations, as both began negotiating a historic civil nuclear deal, intending to set up nuclear reactors and transferring technologies for the purposes of nuclear energy. India has also become an important partner for the U.S. owing to their common interests in maintaining the Freedom of Navigation in the Eastern Seas, which China claims to as its own.
Conflicting interests notwithstanding, China and India have found in each other, significant potential for investment. As a leading manufacturing hub, China finds India’s vast markets quite suitable. The trade between both the Asian giants, as of 2019, is about to touch a historic $100 billion figure. In economic terms, therefore, both nations realize the significance of one another. China has its own reasons to consider Pakistan an ally, which has been a long-standing nemesis for India and a trouble-maker for Asia at large. However, in consideration of the fact that China’s foreign policy is driven solely by economic interests, it would not be long before China’s relations with Pakistan begin to cool down to a certain extent.
Yet another defence partner of significance is France, with which defence deals, such as the Rafale fighter jet deal, have been signed. France is also committed to boosting military aerospace research and development programmes under 30% of the offset commitment made under the Rafale deal.
Defence deals involve the sector of high-technology, and it would be unfair to miss Israel inasmuch as this sector is concerned. That India has built healthy relations with Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, in spite of hostilities between Israel and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, is remarkable. India’s ties with one have never affected its ties with the other.
Growing economic interests have inevitably brought ASEAN closer, and India hopes to boost its relations with Australia in light of maritime interests and the rest. It can thus be said that with India’s rise as a formidable regional power, its global engagement has grown in intensity manifold in a matter of a few years.
The issues and relationships are different, so too is the argumentation. So, the first caution is to avoid obsessing about consistency, because it makes little sense in such changing circumstances. There is certainly a place for constants, but not to the extent of elevating them to immutable concepts. On the contrary, it is only by recognizing change that we are in a position to exploit opportunities. The purposeful pursuit of national interest in shifting global dynamics may not be easy; but it must be done. And the real obstacle to the rise of India is not anymore, the barriers of the world, but the dogmas of Delhi.
An ability to respond to a variety of situations is part of any nation’s rise. But most agents of change encounter the accumulated ‘wisdom’ of the entrenched, or the passionate argumentation of the polarized. In India, we also meet an obsession with words. Form and process are often deemed more important than outcomes. Fortunately, discontinuous politics is helpful today in challenging past practices and frozen narratives. It does so, taking into account the steady elements of any policy; in India’s case, a persistent striving to expand space and options. Not an end in itself, that is meant to ensure greater prosperity at home, peace on the borders, protection of our people and enhancing influence abroad. Obviously, our national strategy to realize even the more constant goals cannot be static in an evolving world. We know that well, having seen the world move from bipolarity to uni-polarity and then to multi-polarity. But changes in strategy also need to cater for greater capabilities, ambitions and responsibilities. And most of all, for changed circumstances. In approaching such a world in transformation, we must recognize that assumptions need to be regularly revisited and calculations frequently revised. To do that, an accurate reading of recent history is essential. That exercise by itself can encourage appreciating the compulsions of responding to the environment, rather than mechanically applying doctrines and concepts.
COMMENTS – India had historically been a hesitant country inasmuch as the willingness to take risks was a factor. For instance, India was characterized with hesitation in developing full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel in fear of offending the Arab world. Indira Gandhi was, the only Prime Minister during the Cold War era who took bold stances. Notwithstanding the lofty ideals of Nehruvian foreign policy, much of them formed the legacy of the ideas developed during the Indian National Movement, not necessarily best-suited to Indian foreign policy. The two aforementioned paragraphs by the Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs, Dr. Jaishankar, simply highlights the overly cautious approach that characterized India for long.
Now, evidence strongly supports the view that India has advanced its interests effectively when it made hard-headed assessments of contemporary geopolitics. And even more so when it did not hesitate to break with its past. The 1971 Bangladesh war, the 1992 economic and political re-positioning, the 1998 nuclear tests or the 2005 India-US nuclear deal are instructive examples. Indeed, it is only through a series of disruptions that India was able to bring about decisive shifts in its favour. In contrast, the pursuit of an apparently consistent course despite changing circumstances often led us to lose the plot. This was the case with engaging China in the 1950s as part of a larger post-colonial front, even as political differences sharpened over a boundary dispute and a Tibet complication. The experience with Pakistan was similar, despite that country moving to greater reliance on terrorism. To some extent, this is a debate about realism and hard security. What it really suggests is a need for an unsentimental audit of Indian foreign policy.
COMMENTS – To add to the examples provided by the Hon’ble Minister, it was only in the 1990s that India established full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel. 2019 marked the first year when India did not hesitate in extending diplomatic support to Israel on one of the resolutions put to vote by the United Nations. India, therefore, seems to be gaining confidence in its foreign policy of late, and as opposed to largely cautious approaches of the past, marked with only rare instances of boldness, it now seems more confident about asserting its interests on the international arena. India’s decisive responses to Malaysia and Turkey, following the statements made by these respective countries on the abrogation of Article 370, inadvertently echoing Pakistani sentiments, is yet another good instance.
India’s record includes dark moments like the 1962 defeat against China. Or tense ones like the 1965 war with Pakistan where the outcome hung in balance till the very end. And the more triumphal ones such as the 1971 victory which created Bangladesh. There are enough dichotomies in our past to generate a spirited debate on successes and failures. A misreading of geopolitics and economics up to 1991 stands out in contrast to the reformist policies thereafter. Two decades of nuclear indecision ended dramatically with the tests of 1998. The lack of response to 26/11 is so different from the Uri and Balakot operations. Whether it is events or trends, they all bear scrutiny for the lessons they hold. If we look back at this journey of independent India, the growth in its capabilities and influence should not conceal the missed chances and shortcomings. The roads not taken may often be an exercise in imagination. But equally, they are a sign of honest introspection. A power that is serious about self-improvement should not, I am convinced, shrink from such an undertaking.
COMMENTS – 2016 marked the first year when India carried out decisive military action in hostile territory during peacetime. 2019 marked the first instance of India using its air power to combat terrorism, when Indian jets flew into enemy airspace and returned unharmed. These are signs of an India whose confidence is on ascension.
How has Indian foreign policy evolved since Independence? Understanding that is done best by dividing into six broad phases, each a response to a different strategic environment. The first phase from 1946-62 could be characterized as an era of optimistic non-alignment. Its setting was very much of a bipolar world, with camps led by the United States and the USSR. India’s objectives were to resist the constraining of its choices and dilution of its sovereignty as it rebuilt its economy and consolidated its integrity. Its parallel goal, as the first of the decolonized nations, was to lead Asia and Africa in a quest for a more equitable world order. This was the heyday of Bandung and Belgrade, the peak of Third World solidarity. It also saw energetic Indian diplomacy from Korea and Vietnam to the Suez and Hungary. For a few years, our position on the world stage seemed assured. The 1962 conflict with China not only brought this period to an end, but in a manner that significantly damaged India’s standing.
COMMENTS - With the dawn of Indian independence, the leadership was aware that the new nation had to fight poverty, illiteracy and disease, and these were the grounds that would primarily shape India's foreign policy. Such conditions could not be achieved by joining military blocs, and therefore, India led the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was not merely India that its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had in mind, but also other countries of Asia and Africa. India was, even with independence, an influential country inasmuch as its size and influence over the Indian Ocean trade routes was concerned. Therefore, India had the potential to stand out as a leader among the newly independent and impoverished countries.
With this realization, Nehru found it significant that India extend support to colonial and ex-colonial countries to the greatest possible extent. Case in point: when the Dutch attempted to re-colonize Indonesia in December 1948, it was Nehru who invited the states bordering the Indian Ocean, including Australia, and placed the issue before the Asian Relations Conference, which resolved to deny all facilities to Dutch shipping. Resolutions were also sent to the UN. Within a week, the Security Council resolved that a ceasefire be declared, and that the Indonesian national government be restored. Thus, India’s position on the world stage seemed, as the Hon’ble Minister said, well-assured.
The second phase from 1962-71 is a decade of realism and recovery. India made pragmatic choices on security and political challenges despite a paucity of resources. It looked beyond non-alignment in the interest of national security, concluding a now largely forgotten defence agreement with the U.S. in 1964. External pressures on Kashmir mounted in this period of vulnerability. The global context remained bipolar, but it now saw the emergence of limited cooperation between the US and USSR. South Asia happened to be a particular area of convergence and Indian diplomacy had to face the superpowers together, as it did in Tashkent in 1965. It was also a period when domestic challenges were particularly acute, ranging from political turbulence to economic distress. But for our purposes, what is important is that even though the stress levels were higher, we came through an anxious period without too much damage.
COMMENTS – Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, laid great emphasis on national security. It was under her administration that India created a new organization to specialize on gathering external intelligence. Thus, national security was added to the list of parameters India considered in formulating its foreign policy. This is reflected even today, in terms of military exercises and defence deals.
The third phase, from 1971 to 1991, was one of greater Indian regional assertion. It started with the decisive dismantlement of an India-Pakistan equivalence through creation of Bangladesh, but ended with the IPKF misadventure in Sri Lanka. The larger environment by now was dramatically different, with the Sino-US rapprochement of 1971 upending the strategic landscape. The Indo-Soviet Treaty and the adoption of more pro-Soviet positions on international issues were India’s response to this challenge. It was a particularly complex phase as the US-China-Pakistan axis which came into being at this time seriously threatened India’s prospects. While they had many long-term consequences, the shift in India’s posture came more from other factors. The collapse of USSR, its close ally, and the not unconnected economic crisis in 1991 compelled us to look again at the first principles of both domestic and foreign policy.
COMMENTS – Under Indira Gandhi, India’s relationship with the Soviet Union improved manifold. This continued uninterrupted. It could be theorized that the expansion of socialism in India led to this deepening of Indo-Soviet ties. As rightly pointed out by the Hon’ble Minister, however, India had to relook its stance with the collapse of the USSR.
The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of a "uni-polar” world characterized the fourth phase. It encouraged a radical rethink in India on a broad range of issues. And it shifted focus to safeguarding strategic autonomy. If India opened up economically more to the world, its reflection was also evident in new diplomatic priorities and approaches. The Look East policy summarized the changed Indian approach to world affairs, which also saw adjustments in its position on Israel. This is a period where India reached out to engage the US more intensively, yet did so while protecting its equities in critical areas. This quest for strategic autonomy was particularly focused on securing its nuclear weapon option, but also visible in trade negotiations. By the turn of the century, enough had happened for India to now shift gear again and move to a higher level. After 1998, it was now a declared nuclear weapon power, had fended off Pakistan’s military adventurism again in Kargil in 1999, generated enough economic growth to be of global interest, and managed well a United States that was focusing more on developments in Asia and the consequences of Islamic fundamentalism.
COMMENTS – The 1990s formed critical years of India’s foreign policy. In the early years of the decade, the situations were difficult to the point of suffocation. The first Clinton Administration in the U.S. was very hostile towards India. The country faced international backlash on the Kashmir issue. The government was a minority government, dependent on the support of other political parties. India had barely two weeks of foreign exchange reserves left. The IMF and World Bank refused to grant further aid to India. The nation’s time-tested ally, the Soviet Union, had collapsed, leaving the erstwhile superpower much weaker than what it was earlier, and a hostile United States singly led the world order. In the midst of this extreme turmoil, India implemented unprecedented economic reforms that would change India’s journey forever. With the reforms arrived foreign direct investment, and the potential sizeable market that India could become with its newly implemented reforms. The second Clinton Administration was marked with sincere efforts by the U.S. to develop ties with India, barring the sanctions faced by India for its nuclear tests. The fruits of the reforms had begun to show as India began its ascent to economic prosperity.
This more competitive environment opened up new windows of opportunity for India, especially as the United States found it difficult to maintain the same degree of uni-polarity. As a consequence, India discovered the benefits of working with different powers on different issues. This fifth phase is one where India gradually acquired the attributes of a balancing power. It is reflected in the India-US nuclear deal as well as a better understanding with the West at large. At the same time, India could also make common cause with China on climate change and trade, and consolidate further ties with Russia while helping to fashion BRICS into a major forum. This was, in some senses, a period of opportunity where India moved the global needle by taking new positions.
COMMENTS – India’s economic growth generated enough interest in the West. American political scientist and diplomat, Condoleezza Rice, had stressed the importance of developing ties with India early on in the years of the Bush Administration. Ever since, the positive ties with the United States have been of immense help to India. Subsequent years saw India playing important roles in setting forth the agenda of forums such as BRICS and ASEAN. India’s leadership role was seen when it launched the International Solar Alliance.
A number of developments came together to change calculations by 2014, initiating the sixth phase. To begin with, China gathered more momentum and the terms of engagement it offered to the world progressively hardened. Balancing works best during a period of transition and was, therefore, inevitably mitigated as new realities took root. At the other extreme, the American trumpet sounded increasingly uncertain. U.S. resource limitation was aggravated by risk aversion in the aftermath of the Iraq war. Declaring an Afghan withdrawal and displaying growing tepidity in the Asia-Pacific sent messages well beyond the immediate issues. For its part, Europe too turned increasingly inwards, not appreciating that political agnosticism would have its own cost. Japan’s efforts to acquire a greater say continued to unfold only gradually. The full impact of the 2008 financial crisis and global economic re-balancing made itself felt in a variety of ways. As the world saw a wider dispersal of power and more localized equations, it was evident that multi-polarity was now seriously upon us. Clearly, this called for a very different approach than practicing politics with a more limited set of dominant players.
Faced with all these developments and assessing the state of global regimes and coalitions, India chose to turn to more energetic diplomacy. It did so, recognizing that we were now entering a world of convergences and issue-based arrangements. This awareness was accompanied by a growing sense of its own capabilities. What it has brought out is not just the limitations of others, but the expectations that the world has of India. That we have emerged among the major economies of the world is one factor, though admittedly the most important. The relevance of our talent to global technology is another, one likely to grow in time. Our ability to shoulder greater responsibilities at a time when the world is more reticent is also evident. Equally significant is a willingness to shape key global negotiations, such as in Paris on climate change. The investment of greater resources in development partnerships with countries of the South was also noteworthy. And not least, the manner in which we have approached our own region and the extended neighbourhood has resonated beyond.
COMMENTS – The IT sector had begun taking off in India, and the country soon became an IT giant. There were suddenly many jobs available and many more international organizations to deal with, which gave India greater exposure to the international arena. Incoming investments, increasing literacy rates and GDP per capita made one thing certain: India was no longer in the era of helpless uncertainty. It was now a prominent player in global geopolitics, and could assert its own interests.
India’s diplomatic agenda has broadened considerably, as indeed have its partners in those endeavours. We share with the international community, the objective that a multi-polar world should have a multi-polar Asia at its core. And to ensure that, India needs to follow an approach of working with multiple partners on different agendas. Obviously, they would each have their importance and priority. But Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas is today as relevant in foreign policy. It is the nations who have an optimal mix of capabilities, relationships and positioning who can aspire to occupy the multiple poles of the emerging international order. And it is the confidence of being able to forge ahead in this looser architecture that can inspire us to emerge as a leading power in the future.
COMMENTS – The Narendra Modi-led government has been keen on replicating its idea of Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas (Support of all, progress of all, trust of all) in the context of internal growth, in the global arena as well. This was indicated when India launched the South Asian Satellite, declaring it a gift to nations such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan etc. in order to boost cooperation in tele-education, telemedicine, telecommunications, weather-mapping etc. This clearly placed India in a position of a leader, for it is verily one of the foremost players in the sector of space technology. India looks forward to rally nations behind it in order to establish a multi-polar Asia so that the Asian continent, too, may have a significant say in global geopolitics, a privilege enjoyed largely only by the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
Each of the six phases have had their highs and lows. In fact, the ending of one could be the beginning of another. The 1971 Bangladesh war or the 1998 nuclear tests stand out in the positive category. But the negative ones perhaps were more directly responsible for substantial changes of course. The 1962 reverse vis-à-vis China was one example. The combination of events as diverse as the Gulf War, the break-up of USSR, economic stagnation and domestic turbulence coming together in 1991 was another. Therefore, while not being dogmatic about the past, it is just as important not to be dismissive about it. This is crucial to appreciate because there are both strains of continuity and change in our policy. Conceptually, each period could be visualized as the overlay on the previous one, rather than either a negation or just an extrapolation. Thus, the independent mindset that drove non-alignment and then protected our strategic equities can today be better expressed in multiple partnerships.
So, what does the past teach us? Seven decades of foreign policy certainly offer a lot of lessons, especially if we contemplate a challenging road ahead. They span a broad spectrum, both in time and in outcomes. A dispassionate assessment of our performance would note that while we ourselves have done well in many respects, many competitors have done much better. Overcoming many challenges, India consolidated its national unity and integrity. That was not a given, noting that some other diverse societies like USSR and Yugoslavia did not make it in the same period. A modern economy with industrial capacities was developed over time, even as our reliance on nature was mitigated in agriculture. Defence preparedness was improved and one of the key accomplishments of diplomacy was to enable access to multiple sources of equipment and technology. However, the fact remains that even after seven decades of independence, many of our borders remain unsettled. In the economic sphere, we may look good when bench-marked against our own past. It seems a little different when compared to China or South East Asia. So, what really matters is to develop a sharp awareness about our own performance. And the lessons of that exercise can be captured in five baskets of issues.
COMMENTS – While there have been several positives about India’s foreign policy, it has been unable to achieve goals such as peace with Pakistan. It may not be wise to label it a failure for the plain and simple reason that Pakistan is not willing to cooperate. It may, nonetheless, be a challenge to India to achieve Pakistan’s cooperation by getting the world to put substantial pressure on the country so that it may behave as a civilized nation ought to. Therefore, while India has indubitably progressed to such a great extent, it faces several challenges that would be core to its national security.
The first relates to the need for greater realism in policy. International relations are very much a test of will. Swami Vivekananda perceptively described the world as a gymnasium where nations come to make themselves strong. Particularly in the phase of optimistic non-alignment, perhaps even later, our focus on diplomatic visibility sometimes led to overlooking the harsher realities of hard security. The early misreading of Pakistan’s intentions can perhaps be explained away by lack of experience. But the reluctance to attach overriding priority to securing borders even a decade later is much more difficult to justify. It was not just that the challenges of 1962 were unanticipated. It was more that a diplomacy focused on world politics did not give it the primacy it deserved. Somewhere, there was an implicit but deeply entrenched belief that India’s high standing in world affairs was protection enough against global turbulence and competitive politics. It was, therefore, at some cost that we discovered that outcomes can be decided as much on the field as at conferences. This is a relevant takeaway even now, despite having entered a more constrained world. Interestingly, it is not that India always shrank from the applications of force when required. Hyderabad in 1948 and Goa in 1961 are illustrative examples, as indeed is Kashmir when attacked by Pakistan. But having so strongly built up an image of a reluctant power, we also ended up influenced by our own narrative.
COMMENTS – As explained earlier, much of the Nehruvian foreign policy was driven by idealism that characterized the Indian National Movement. India was not ruthlessly objective and analytical. Therefore, one may wonder whether India should have been thus righteous in its approach, and followed a foreign policy based on economic interests instead. One of the biggest failures of Nehru's administration was the internationalization of the Kashmir issue. The United Nation's evident pro-Pakistan tilt left Nehru downcast, but the damage had been done. It also did not help that the initial friendliness with China turned bitter when India gave asylum to the Dalai Lama, eventually culminating in the 1962 war against China. It was during this time when Nehru felt a great sense of betrayal, and faced incessant criticism back home. In all probability, the criticism was warranted, for Nehru's foreign policy insisted upon promoting a vague notion of world peace, which resulted in his administration not paying enough attention to India's defence. Moreover, Nehru did not appear to realize that the lofty ideals of world peace and nuclear disarmament which he held, were too idealistic and would bring no fundamental change, except for earning a few praises on the international arena. However, the most prudent of lessons are often learnt the hard way. India appears to have learnt to prioritize economic interests today over idealism, for there is a need to sail through the choppy, and even treacherous waters, of international relations, with a certain degree of self-interest.
Due to that, we rarely prepared for security situations with the sense of mission that many of our competitors displayed. Discomfort with hard power was reflected in lack of adequate consultation with the military, most notably during the 1962 conflict. The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff half-a-century later shows a very different mindset. Judgments of the past that overlooked security implications are also worth studying. An overemphasis on diplomacy also led to a lack of understanding of the behaviour of other polities. The Cold War was seen more as an argumentation, when the reality was a ruthless exercise of power. There was also little awareness in the 1950s that we were dealing with a battle-hardened neighbor to the North. Or indeed of the strategic significance of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. This approach to world affairs continued even thereafter. Thus, in 1972 at Shimla, India chose to bet on an optimistic outlook on Pakistan. At the end of the day, it resulted in both a revanchist Pakistan and a continuing problem in Jammu & Kashmir. That it has taken us so long to link talks with Pakistan to cessation of terrorism speaks for itself. Without overstating the argument, a case can certainly be made for a more grounded Indian approach to international relations.
COMMENTS – Lofty idealism was what could have held India together in the years following the bloody Partition. However, the national leadership apparently held on to it for too long. It was evidently characterized by an injudicious faith in the policy of non-violence propagated by Gandhi, which led to the unfortunate lack of attention to the needs of the Armed Forces, owing to which India paid the price in the 1962 war. While good sense prevailed to a certain extent, India had, even then, not become as objective as it could have been, as pointed out by the Hon’ble Minister.
The economic counterpart of these concerns constitutes a second basket. If one considers all the major growth stories since 1945, a common feature was the extraordinary focus that they put on leveraging the global environment. China did that with great effect, initially with the USSR and then with the US and the West. The Asian ‘tiger economies’ practiced it as well, using Japan, the US and now China successively to build themselves. That is how India too approached its various relationships over the last seven decades, but not always with the same single-mindedness. Nevertheless, much of India’s industrialization and capacities in other domains were direct achievements of collaborations enabled by diplomacy. Steel, nuclear industry, higher education and computing are some examples. This held true even more for the post-1991 reform period and the shift eastwards of India’s economic centre of gravity. The interconnection between diplomacy, strategy and economic capabilities is, however, not self-evident. As in security, it is important to distinguish between cause and effect. The economy drives diplomacy; not the other way around. Few would argue that the reforms of the 1990s and greater openness have served us well. But as we then extrapolated it onto free trade agreements with South-East and East Asia, the proposition has become more challengeable. Blame it on structural rigidities, limited competitiveness, inadequate exploitation of opportunities or just plain unfair practices: the growing deficit numbers are a stark reality. More importantly, their negative impact on industry at home is impossible to deny. And China, of course, poses a special trade challenge even without an FTA.
COMMENTS – As rightly pointed out by the Hon’ble Minister, the economy drives diplomacy and not the other way around. In other words, diplomacy is driven by a need to serve economic interests. The economy cannot adjust itself according to international relations. It is, therefore, a challenge for Indian diplomacy to address the issues of rising deficit numbers. That India faces a trade deficit with China crossing $50 billion is no secret.
In this background, the recent debate about the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) offers lessons in foreign policy as much as in the trade domain. On the one hand, we should not go back to the old dogmas of economic autarky and import substitution. But at the same time, embracing the new dogma of globalization without a cost-benefit analysis is equally dangerous. What we saw in Bangkok recently was a clear-eyed calculation of the gains and costs of entering a new arrangement. We negotiated till the very end, as indeed we should. Then, knowing what was on offer, we took a call. And that call was that no agreement at this time was better than a bad agreement. It is also important to recognize what the RCEP is not. It is not about stepping back from the Act East policy, which in any case is deeply rooted in distant and contemporary history. Our cooperation spans so many domains that this one decision does not really undermine the basics. Even in trade, India already has FTAs with 12 out of the 15 RCEP partners. Nor is there really a connection with our Indo-Pacific approach, as that goes well beyond the RCEP membership. There can be a legitimate debate on the merits of joining RCEP or any other FTA for that matter. Just don’t confuse it for grand strategy.
COMMENTS –
RCEP is a proposed regional free trade agreement (FTA) comprising of ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Laos and Vietnam) and their 6 FTA partners (India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand). In early November, India withdrew from the proposed FTA. This sparked off a debate regarding the merits and demerits of doing so. The government evidently gave priority to indigenous economic interests, in light of India’s trade deficit, not only with China but also with other RCEP countries.
Moreover, according to NITI Aayog, at a time of growing protectionism and US’s stance towards China, opening India’s market for China could have had an adverse impact on India’s economy. Under the agreement, tariffs would have been lowered, which would lead to unrestricted imports into India with very limited access for Indian exports into the Chinese market. There were also concerns that New Zealand’s export-oriented dairy products would have negatively impacted India’s growing dairy sector, which is largely small-scale. There are concerns that RCEP would have adverse impact on Indian manufacturing sector while competing with cheaper products from ASEAN and China.
According to civil society representatives, reduction of import duties to promote global value chain will lead to mass layoffs, low wages and exploitation of labour. Further, Japan and South Korea have asked India to eliminate export restrictions on minerals and raw materials. This may threaten domestic raw material availability for industrialization and encourage over-mining. Indian experts opine that this would lead to a new form of neo-colonialism.
There were also advantages as regards increased market access in the times of increased protectionism, facilitation of India’s Act East Policy, boost to FDI etc. However, the government made clear its willingness to negotiate further. There is, therefore, a significant lesson in foreign policy inasmuch as India’s economic interests and political economy are concerned.
Any quest to maximize options and expand space naturally requires engaging multiple players. Conceptually, this third basket is a given in Indian foreign policy since there is a basic consensus about nurturing our independence. While it has served us very well in the first decade of a bipolar world, we also discovered the associated danger of being left short on all accounts. As India saw in 1962, the best of both worlds is easier imagined than realized. In the periods thereafter, the distance from one pole was also not automatically compensated by the other. Sometimes, global circumstances required us – as in 1971 – to lean on one side, just as China itself did in 1950 and 1971. As a general rule, extracting more from the international system depends on the bigger picture and a zero-sum game cannot be an assumption. Indeed, a particularly disturbing scenario that nations like India and China faced in the 1960s was the prospect of the superpowers finding common ground. That is why the talk of a G2 even decades later created such deep unease again in so many quarters. Hedging is a delicate exercise, whether it is the non-alignment and strategic autonomy of earlier periods, or multiple engagements of the future. But there is no getting away from it in a multi-polar world. This is a game best played on the front-foot, appreciating that progress on any one front strengthens one’s hand on all others. In that sense, it is having many balls up in the air at the same time and displaying the confidence and dexterity to drop none. To the uninitiated or the anachronistic, the pursuit of apparently contradictory approaches and objectives may seem baffling. How do you reconcile a Howdy Modi, a Mamallapuram and a Vladivostok? Or the RIC (Russia-India-China) with JAI (Japan-America-India)? Or the Quad with the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)? An Iran with the Saudis or Israel with Palestine? The answer is in a willingness to look beyond dogma and enter the real world of convergences. Think of it, not just as arithmetic but as calculus. This new game is a challenge for practitioners and analysts alike, but one that must be mastered to forge ahead.
COMMENTS – A mature approach to foreign policy, particularly while engaging with countries that do not see an eye to eye on several issues, is formulating policy largely on economic interests. More often than not, foreign policy driven by economic interests results in a situation that benefits both countries. It is healthy when, even in situations of conflicting economic interests, concerned parties negotiate and arrive at a consensus. Even defence deals are done in a manner which benefit the countries involved. For instance, the Rafale deal with France under the offset agreement brings in French investment in India’s military aerospace research and establishes an indigenous manufacturing unit, thereby creating jobs. France, on the other hand, profits immensely from the deal in light of the fact that the deal amounts to a whopping Rs. 60,000 crores. India has largely followed this approach with almost all countries. This is why it has been able to maintain healthy relations with Iran and Israel at the same time. Therefore, a visit to either of these countries is not viewed suspiciously, say as an attempt to form a bilateral alliance against the other. Iran is an existential threat to Israel, yet India’s good relations with Iran do not lead Israel to believe that India echoes Iran’s anti-Israel sentiments. This is what could be termed a low-risk approach, for India does not bind itself to alliances of a military type that are aimed at targeting nations. Its military engagement is restricted to targeting terrorism and enhancing multilateral defence cooperation, particularly in the seas.
Risk-taking is an inherent aspect of diplomacy and most policy judgments revolve around its mechanics. It is also a natural accompaniment to hedging. When we look at this fourth basket, it is evident that a low-risk foreign policy is only likely to produce limited rewards. On occasions when India departed from this mode, some risks paid off while others did not. We laid out our broad approach as early as 1946 and developed that framework as time went on. Although India came under pressure in 1962 and 1971, it limited the compromises that it had to make and sought to revert to the earlier posture as and when it could. Over the course of its rise, it introduced new concepts and terms to deal with emerging issues, without necessarily abandoning the earlier ones. The cumulative impression was thus of a steady and middle of the road approach that gathered greater substance as India’s influence grew. But having noted that, the truth is that ascending up the global ladder did require taking big calls, whether conventional or nuclear, political or economic. Not all risks are necessarily dramatic; many just require the confident calculations and determined follow up of day-to-day management but their aggregate impact can result in a quantum jump in global positioning. To a certain degree, we see that happening today.
COMMENTS – Certain risks are entirely dramatic, such as India’s decisive action in the 1971 war. It was well-planned, but it led to changed maps and changed geopolitical realities. The U.S. watched, helpless, as India dissected its dear ally Pakistan into two parts, one of which became an independent country as India achieved resounding victory on 16 December 1971 with the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers. Yet another instance would be India’s declaration of itself as a full-fledged nuclear state. This was one of the biggest failures in the history of the CIA, for it failed to conclusively establish that India was up to something big. Other risks such as the economic reforms of 1991 were not so dramatic, yet held deep significance for India and propelled India to unprecedented economic heights. A continuation is seen with an India more confident about using its military prowess to target terrorism and confident about its support to Israel.
The fifth basket is in a return to the diplomatic primer: reading the global tea leaves right. The foreign policy of all nations is set against the backdrop of global contradictions. They reflect an assessment of opportunities and compulsions, and of risks and rewards. Even if we are to get our immediate situation right, a misreading of the larger landscape can prove costly. In our own case, going to the United Nations on Jammu & Kashmir clearly misread the intent of the Anglo-American alliance then and of the seriousness of the Cold War. Years later, our early awareness about growing Sino-Soviet differences did not mature on our expected timelines. In the 1960s, 1980s and again after 2001, we grossly underestimated the relevance of Pakistan to American and Chinese global strategy. This is not to suggest that India has not had its successes. Indo-Soviet and later Indo-Russian relations are a direct product of our global strategizing. After 1991, so too has been the adjustment in our policy towards the United States. Both the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the India-US Nuclear Deal were outcomes of a larger reading of world. That is the case with correctives introduced in respect of the US in 1973 and China in 1976 to overcome the polarization that had been created by the 1971 situation. Identifying the opportunities thrown up by the structure of world politics can also help mitigate risks. We saw that, for example, in respect to France after the 1998 nuclear tests. Today, an appreciation of world politics must include a proper understanding of Sino-US contradictions, of growing multi-polarity, of weaker multilateralism, of larger economic and political re-balancing, of greater space for regional powers, and of the world of convergences. Each of them is a factor in driving the policy initiatives of the present era. Whether it is our outreach to the Gulf, the advocacy of Indo-Pacific or more vigorous engagement of Europe, they represent a facet of a larger re-positioning
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Observers of international relations today would have assuredly heard or read about the ongoing Sino-US trade war. The result is that it has led to global risk-off sentiments, leading to decreased investments and fears of a worldwide recession. Therefore, as advised by the Hon’ble Minister, an appreciation of today’s world politics must include a proper understanding of Sino-US contradictions. Inevitably, with the growth of regional powers and other countries, the era of multi-polarity has descended on the world, and it continues to grow. When compared to the Cold War, or even World War II Era, today’s era does not achieve much through a single alliance of numerous countries, militarily speaking, resulting in weaker multilateralism. For instance, in spite of there being a coalition of eighty-one countries against ISIS, the power does not translate to much on ground for the following reasons:
(1) – It is inconceivable that eighty-one countries would contribute militarily for the plain and simple reason that it is nigh impossible for affected countries to provide land enough for even a tenth of the coalition countries to set up military bases.
2 – The brunt of the activity is largely borne by the United States. Other countries are largely involved in the role of intelligence gathering, and only occasional air strikes.
3 – While important, it is not sufficient to deprive ISIS of its manpower. It would require mammoth efforts to counter its overly violent ideology. An alliance of countries would not achieve much of significance.
A case may thus be made for weaker multilateralism. Alliances would not achieve much, and the most powerful nations would singly set forth a global agenda.
So, what are the prospects of the sixth phase that is now underway? A changing world is clearly a more actionable one for those who do not wish to get left behind. As Rabindranath Tagore declared, you cannot cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water. For a beginning, it requires a thinking that keeps up with times. A clearer definition of interests is the next step and its determined pursuit of that the one thereafter. We see that today, for example, in a better appreciation of our maritime geography and the SAGAR doctrine. When confronted by security challenges, this India has also responded with a new grit. Its enthusiasm for shaping global conversations on climate change, terrorism, connectivity and maritime security is already having an impact. The humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations undertaken in Yemen, Nepal, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Fiji and Mozambique are statements of capability as much as of responsibility. Its election winning record in international organizations is another important statement. Expanded offers of development assistance have been accompanied by an improved record of project execution. The neighbourhood and Africa will surely testify to this change. India’s branding has become much stronger, including the International Day of Yoga, the International Solar Alliance or most recently, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.
COMMENTS – This clearly bespeaks an India which recognizes the importance not merely of economic and military prowess, but also soft power, as evidenced by the recognition of International Yoga Day.
While the previous phases of foreign policy each have a neat description, how do we categorize the current one? Part of the challenge is that we are still in the early phase of a major transition. The contours of even the near future are not yet clear. One solution is to anchor it on Indian aspirations and speak of our goal of emerging as a leading power. The problem is that others tend to take it as a statement of arrival rather than a goal on the horizon. Taking off from non-alignment, we could perhaps speak today of multi-alignment. It appears more energetic, more participative as compared to an earlier posture of abstention or non-involvement it certainly sounds very much more vigorous. The difficulty is that it also appears opportunistic, whereas India is really seeking strategic convergence rather than tactical convenience. Putting India First may be another way of capturing a strong and pragmatic policy outlook. But this suffers from a comparison with other nations, some of whom have chosen to be more self-centered. In India’s case, nationalism has in fact led to greater internationalism. Advancing prosperity and influence may be a fair description but it is not exactly a catch word. Perhaps we need to accept that a single phrase may elude us for some time in the midst of global uncertainty.
COMMENTS – It is, needless to say, prudent for the academia to assign a term to the current form of foreign policy that characterizes India. As regards the Hon’ble Minister’s statement that in India’s case, nationalism has, in fact, led to greater internationalism, truer words may have seldom been spoken. The nationalism that is seen in India is that of confidence, for Indians have seen their stature rising in the international arena. It is, therefore, quite justified that Indians should feel that their voices and interests be heard on the global platform. Indian nationalism seeks to rebuild India, an endeavour which, in today’s world, requires a very proactive engagement with the rest of the world.
Now, as we stand poised to move to the next level, did we lose valuable time in doing so? Such queries are often a product of hindsight and may lack context. But nevertheless, these are issues that could be pondered about, especially if we speak of outcomes of judgment rather than of circumstances. Our ties with China are a natural beginning for such a discussion. Should India, for example, have brought the boundary issue to head in 1950 itself? Could the border conflict of 1962 have been avoided by a compromise in 1960 when Zhou Enlai came to India? With the United States, did our cultural antipathy in the initial years aggravate the sense of distance? On economic issues, perhaps there is probably more consensus that India should have followed the example of ASEAN and China and opened up a decade than it did. On the strategic side, the delay in its self-declaration as a nuclear weapon power from 1974 to 1998 may well have been the worst of all worlds. Were we prisoners to paper, a trait that came close to wrecking the 2005 nuclear deal as well? Our past handling of Pakistan, a society which we are supposed to know well, also raises many questions. These are not exactly hypothetical situations and are cited to underline the contention that emergence as a leading power requires great pragmatism. That can be further strengthened by more sophisticated narratives that can help reconcile divergences. After all, our emphasis on sovereignty has not prevented us from responding to human rights situations in our neighbourhood. Nor indeed have the steps that India has taken to ensure its integrity and promote regional security – whether in Hyderabad, Goa, or abroad in Sri Lanka or Maldives - made us less multilateral.
COMMENTS – It is certainly a matter of introspection, multiple viewpoints and consequent debate as regards India’s past and present approaches to foreign policy. Nevertheless, important lessons are definitely offered by an objective analysis of India’s foreign policy. These lessons are what would help India remain pragmatic as it continues its ascension on the scale of economic, military, scientific, educational and diplomatic power.
Now this talk is about dogma, and entrenched views are naturally strongest on the more perennial challenges. In the case of India, it will come as no surprise to any of you that this relates to Pakistan. Changes in thinking will trigger a debate and that has been the case for the past few years. The fact is that we had allowed the narrative to focus mainly on a dialogue, when the real issue was stopping cross-border terrorism. Dogma treats every new approach as an unjustified deviation. In the last five years, however, a different normal has developed and global conversations on cross-border terrorism have become more serious. Just look at the FATF as proof of that assertion. As we move decisively to combat separatism in Jammu & Kashmir, there is some talk today of its internationalization and hyphenation of our ties with Pakistan. This is thinking from the past, reflecting neither the strength of India, the mood of the nation nor the determination of the Government. Uninformed comments abroad on our internal affairs is hardly internationalization. And the reputational and real differences between India and Pakistan puts paid to any hyphenation effort. In reality, these fears are but a thinly disguised advocacy of inaction. Their intent, conscious or otherwise, is to legitimize a status quo that has now been overtaken by history.
COMMENTS – As many may have already realized, the context of this paragraph is the abrogation of Article 370. Post this, the Ministry of External Affairs went into an overdrive mode, explaining the decision of the government on the world stage, and assuring the world of no serious consequences. However, vested interests, from Pakistan and elsewhere, sought to escalate the issue by trying their best to ensure that the issue would be gravely heard in the individual parliaments of the world (particularly in the United States Congress) and in the United Nations. The skillful diplomacy displayed by India, however, demolished their hopes, and the world soon moved on after India was able to convince other nations of its stand and the positive impact it would have on the people of Kashmir in the long run. It is in this context that the Hon’ble Minister said that uninformed comments abroad about India’s internal affairs was hardly internationalization.
The balance sheet for India’s foreign policy after seven decades presents a mixed picture. National development is at the heart of any assessment, and it is difficult to quarrel with the view that there has been significant progress, but not enough. The comparison with what China achieved in the same period is sobering. Reading the global tea leaves right and then leveraging the international situation could have gone better. Indeed, the mantra of unchanging foreign policy axioms has discouraged an honest review of our performance and the introduction of timely correctives. Diligence and debate have not been as rigorous as they should for an aspiring player. When combined with the hesitations of history, it had led to unexplored avenues and unrealized outcomes. But we are now at the cusp of change. With more confidence, the pursuit of seemingly divergent goals and the straddling of contradictions are being attempted. Taking risks is inherent to the realization of ambitions. A nation that has the aspiration to become a leading power someday cannot continue with unsettled borders, an unintegrated region and under-exploited opportunities. Above all, it cannot be dogmatic in approaching a visibly changing global order. Napoleon once said that history is a version of past events that people have decided to agree upon. The world that awaits us not only calls for fresh thinking, but eventually, a new consensus at home as well. Putting dogmas behind us is a starting point for that journey.
COMMENTS – In conclusion, India needs to abandon its insecurities and dogmas of foreign policy that characterized its past. It needs to be more pragmatic than ever, for the current global order is that of uncertainty with the economic clash between the U.S. and China.
The priorities of India, in addition to economic interests, now need to be: settling border disputes, settling the issue of unintegrated regions such as PoK and others not part of the mainstream, and being cognizant of under-exploited opportunities, such as increasing the country’s economic influence in other countries, announcing international infrastructure projects, extending economic aid etc.
There is much to do. Notwithstanding the occasional treacherous waters of international relations, upcoming times would be of great interest, for India’s consolidation of its position remains to be seen.
Thank you very much.